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Pretrial Drug Testing: An Essential Step
in Bail Reform
John A. Carver*
I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

On March 5, 1984, a press conference was held in a
conference room of the District of Columbia Superior Court.
Before a small group of reporters, a photographer or two, and a
camera crew, Chief Judge H. Carl Moultrie, I. announced a
new program of on-site drug testing. Funded with a grant from
the National Institute of Justice to the District of Columbia
Pretrial Services Agency, the program was essentially a
research project, designed to produce studies on the
relationship between drug use and criminal behavior. With the
latest in drug testing technology installed in a laboratory in the

John A. Carver III, Esq. Mr. Carver is the Director of the District of
Columbia Pretrial Services Agency, one of the oldest and largest such programs in
the country.
A 1967 graduate of the University of Wisconsin, Mr. Carver served with the
Peace Corps in Bolivia for three years. He received his J.D. from Georgetown
University Law Center in 1974, and is a member of the Bars of the District of
Columbia and Virginia.
Mr. Carver has been active in the field of pretrial services both nationally and
in the District of Columbia. He is a past president of the National Association of
Pretrial Services Agencies, the current President of the Mid-Atlantic Pretrial
Services Association, and a member of the Criminal Justice Section of the ABA.
The D.C. Pretrial Services Agency, which Mr. Carter heads, has achieved a
national reputation for excellence. It serves as a neutral information source for
judicial officers, both local and federal, in the courts of the District of Columbia.
After interviewing and investigating the background of the persons charged with
criminal offenses, it recommends nonfinancial release alternatives designed to
assure appearance in court and community safety. Awarded the Department of
Justice's designation as an "Enhanced Pretrial Services Program," the Pretrial
Services Agency has frequently served as a model for criminal justice
administrators in other jurisdictions.
Eight years ago, the agency set up a comprehensive program of pretrial drug
screening of all arrestees--the first of its kind in the country. Based on the
success of this program, the Department of Justice sponsored a replication effort in
other jurisdictions.
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courthouse, the program planned to collect urine specimens
from each arrestee, analyze them, and report the results to the
judge or hearing commissioner in "arraignment" court.
Following the press conference, a single article 1 appeared
in the Washington Post describing the research aims of the new
program, and including a photograph of the chemical analyzer
purchased for the new program. Beyond that, there was little
fanfare because the District of Columbia had been drug testing
arrestees since 1970. 2 While law enforcement officials were
concerned about the rise in drug-related crime, drug use was
not yet perceived to be a national problem.
The apathy surrounding this announcement did not last
long. Within a week, the test results documented the existence
of a serious and virtually unrecognized problem of extensive
phencyclidine (PCP) use among the arrestee population. 3
Figures compiled after the second week of testing confirmed
these findings. 4 At about the same time, a series of articles in
the Washington Post described, in lurid detail, the effects of
PCP on some individuals. 5 For the first time, general concerns
about drug use and crime could now be quantified and tracked
with objective data - arrestee test results - summarized at
the end of each month and distributed to an ever-growing list
of public officials and interested persons. The District of
Columbia, through its drug testing program, was able to
document first the PCP epidemic of the mid-eighties, and then
the rise of cocaine use, accelerated by the advent of "crack"
Ed Bruske, D.C. Court Officials Start Defendants' Drug Tests, WASH. POST,
Mar. 6, 1984, at Bl.
2
Judge Harold H. Greene, then Chief Judge of the Court of General
Sessions, issued an order in 1970 permitting officials from the City's Narcotics
Treatment Agency to conduct testing of arrestees in the cell block of the
courthouse. Based on the test results, releasees could be referred to drug
treatment. Although in continuous operation since 1970, by 1984 testing was quite
limited and sporadic.
3
Memorandum from Bruce D. Beaudin, Director of the D.C. Pretrial Services
Agency to the Honorable H. Carl Moultrie, I. (March 13, 1984) (on file with
author). The memo stated that "drug use among adult criminal arrestees was
substantially higher than anticipated," at 61% of those tested. The percentage that
tested positive for PCP was 33%.
4
Memorandum to Ernest Hardaway II, M.D., from Bruce D. Beaudin (March
19, 1984) (on file with author).
5
Ronald Kessler, Producing Hallucinogenic Drug Brought Profits and Risks,
Chemist Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1984, at A9. Ronald Kessler and Alfred E.
Lewis, Police See Use of PCP Rising at Rapid Rate, WASIL POST, Mar. 10, 1984, at
Al. Linda Wheeler, A Life Lived in the Shadow of PCP, WASIL PoST, Mar. 11,
1984, at Al.
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several years later. The latest arrestee drug tests were
frequently cited by public officials and reported in both the
local and national press.
The rest of the story is well known. The cocaine overdose
death of Len Bias on June 19, 19866 profoundly affected the
way in which the American public came to see drug abuse. By
the time the 1988 election rolled around, the drug epidemic
was consistently identified as a major problem facing the
country. 7 During the early months of the Bush administration,
a "Drug Czar" was appointed to direct the latest "drug war."
The President went on television, armed with a bag of crack
seized by the DEA in a staged drug buy in front of the White
House, declaring the drug war to be the nation's highest
priority. Mter the speech, there was an eight fold increase in
news coverage of drug issues, according to the Center for Media
and Public Mfairs. 8
Meanwhile, officials in the Justice Department, impressed
by the success of the District of Columbia's drug testing
program, initiated several related projects. The research arm of
the Department, the National Institute of Justice, announced
the Drug Use Forecasting program, or ''DUF", which was
designed to sample arrestee drug use on a quarterly basis from
a cross section of American cities. The state and local
assistance arm of the Department, the Bureau of Justice
Assistance, set aside several million dollars in discretionary
funding to see if the idea of pretrial drug testing could be
replicated in other jurisdictions. When the White House issued
the first National Drug Control Strategy, drug testing
throughout the criminal justice system was an important
component. 9 Congress enacted legislation for the federal court

Keith Harriston and Sally Jenkins, Maryland Basketball Star Len Bias is
Dead at 22. Evidence of Cocaine Reported Found, WASH. PosT, June 20, 1986, at
Al.
By 1989, a Washington Post-ABC News Poll indicated that public concern
about illicit drugs had doubled in recent months, with 44% of those interviewed
ranking drugs as the country's most serious problem. Among black Americans,
seven out of ten said drugs were the most serious problem facing the nation. L.A.
TIMES, August 23, 1989, pt. 1, at 2.
8
Paul M. Barrett, Moving On: Though the Drug War Isn't Over, Spotlight
Turns to Other Issues. Departing Drug Czar Bennett Considers His Job Done;
Progress but No Victory, WALL ST. J, November 19, 1990, at Al.
9
THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 26 (1989).
Probation, like parole, court-supervised treatment, and some release
programs, should be tied to a regular and rigorous program of drug
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system, establishing demonstration programs of mandatory
pretrial drug testing in eight federal districts. 1° Finally, the
Administration introduced legislation requiring states to
implement criminal justice drug testing as a prerequisite for
receiving block grant assistance funds. 11
In contrast to the enthusiasm with which pretrial drug
testing was embraced by the Reagan Justice Department, the
reception within the community of pretrial services
practitioners was mixed. At annual conferences of the National
Association of Pretrial Services Agencies, there was
considerable debate on a variety of related issues: the policy
implications of research studies; the proper role of pretrial
services agencies; and questions about whether drug testing
advocates had simply been caught up in the ''hysteria" of the
drug wars at the expense of the traditional goals of the bail
reform movement. Fundamental values were questioned and
fears were expressed about the direction of pretrial services.
This article takes the position that pretrial drug testing is
consistent with - indeed an essential component of - the
principles of the bail reform movement as developed and
refmed over the past quarter century. Section II discusses the
development of the bail system, its adoption and modification
in the United States, and twentieth century efforts to reform it.
Section III describes a "model system" of pretrial justice, as set
forth by the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies,
the American Bar Association, and other commentators.
Section IV turns to the drug issue, summarizing what we know
about drug addiction, the relationship between drug addiction
and criminal behavior, and the implications of this body of
testing in order to coerce offenders to abstain from drugs while
integrating them back into the community. Such programs make prison
space available for those drug offenders we cannot safely return to the
streets. But unless they rigidly enforce drug abstinence under the threat
of incarceration, these efforts lose their teeth. Drug tests should be part
of every stage of the criminal justice process-at the time of arrest and
throughout the period of probation or incarceration, and parole-because
they are the most effective way of keeping offenders off drugs both in
and out of detention.

!d.
10
Pub. L. No. 100-690, Title VII, § 7304, 102 Stat. 4464, Nov. 18, 1988. For a
description of the experience of these federal demonstration programs, see

ADMINISI'RATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FINAL REPORT: THE
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM OF MANDATORY DRUG TESTING OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS

(1991).
11

S. 635, 102d Congress, 1st Session (1991).
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knowledge for criminal justice practitioners. Section V
integrates the reality of drug abuse with the principles of a
model system of pretrial justice. The concluding section sets
forth a few thoughts on future directions for pretrial services.
II.

ORIGINS OF THE BAIL SYSTEM

To understand pretrial drug testing, one must first
understand the role of pretrial services agencies and the
context in which they developed. The first programs were
started as social experiments in the mid 1960s, dedicated to
nothing less than overhauling the bail system. Bail - defined
as "the mechanism by which the defendant's right to freedom
prior to trial is squared with society's interest in the smooth
administration of criminal justice" 12 - was seen as an unjust
and inefficient system, operating most harshly against the least
advantaged. The early experiments, such as the Manhattan
Bail Project and the D.C. Bail Project were very much part of
an effort by criminal justice reformers to change the bail
system and eliminate (or at least reduce) the inequities
inherent in it. The discriminatory aspects of the bail system
had already been well chronicled, both in this country, and
throughout the history of the English common law. 13
The bail system dates back to medieval England. 14 It
developed from the ancient Anglo-Saxon forms of sureties. At
that time, individuals charged with crimes were the
responsibility of the Sheriff until a trial could be held by a
judge who appeared from time to time "riding circuit." The
Sheriff, as the local representative of the Crown, had authority
to release the defendant to someone willing to stand as "surety"

12

WAYNE THOMAS, BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 12 (1976).
In a frequently cited article in the University of Pennsylvania Law review,
Professor Caleb Foote describes the early history of abuse in the bail system:
Recognition of the importance of bail in order to avoid pretrial
imprisonment was a central theme in the long struggle to implement the
promise of the famous 39th chapter of Magna Carta that "no freeman
shall be arrested, or detained in prison ... unless ... by the law of the
land." It is significant that three of the most critical steps in this
process--the Petition of Right in 1628, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and
the Bill of Rights of 1689--grew out of cases which alleged abusive denial
of freedom on bail pending trial.
Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959,
965-966 (1965) (citations omitted).
14
For a good, general description of the origins of bail, see THOMAS, supra
note 12.
13
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or personal guarantor that the defendant would appear for
trial. If the defendant did not appear, the personal surety was
literally liable for whatever punishment might be due the
defendant if the surety could not produce the defendant for
trial. Thus, the system was one of personal guarantees, where
a respected member of the community took on the
responsibility to "stand in the shoes" of the defendant in the
event that the defendant absconded.
It was this system that was brought to Colonial America.
It persisted well into the 19th century at which time it began
to take on a uniquely American character. The system
gradually evolved to reflect the changes in social structure in
American life. As opposed to a feudal society, the young nation
was mobile and expansionist in nature. Eventually, the system
of personal sureties was replaced by one of commercial
guarantees. Rather than being personally responsible for the
defendant's punishment, the surety could now be required to
forfeit a sum of money. From this change evolved the system of
compensated sureties for profit that we know today. It should
be pointed out, however, that of all the former Commonwealth
countries, only the United States has a commercial system of
bail bonds.
This evolution from a personal system to a commercial
system was accompanied by persistent but largely ignored
criticisms. 15 These criticisms encompassed several themes. To
the extent that an individual's pretrial freedom was a function
of his ability to pay a bondsman, critics charged that it
discriminated against the poor. By the same token, to the
extent the system permitted the release of more wealthy
defendants, it did not adequately address other concerns of the
16

For general information on early criticisms of the bail system, see JOHN S.
GoLDKAMP & MICHAEL R. Go'ITFREDSON, POLICY GUIDELINES FOR BAIL: AN
EXPERIMENT IN COURT REFORM (1985); THOMAS, supra note 12. See also Leary v.
United States, 224 U.S. 567, 575 (1912) (noting that the bondsman's "interest to
produce the body of the principal in court is impersonal and wholly pecuniary.").
Underscoring the fact that little has changed in the 80 years since this observation
was made in 1912 is an article in the Washington Post describing the recent
crackdown in collecting bond forfeitures in the District of Columbia: "'On a $10,000
bond, I can ask for $11,000,' Williams [a bondsman] said, 'if he doesn't show, the
court gets the $10,000, and I keep my $1,000.' Otherwise, the client gets $10,000
back. That may reduce the bondsman's incentive to hound the client into court, but
in a high-risk, low-yield business, it's a safer bet than trying to collect a bondjumper's car." Alison Howard, Crime Rise No Bonanza for Bondsmen: Unpaid Bail
Forfeitures, Disappearing Clients Plague D. C. Courthouse Businessmen, WASH. POST,
October 5, 1991, at Cl.
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justice system, such as the likelihood that the defendant would
appear in court. In a classic 1927 study of bail practices in
Cook County, Illinois, Arthur Beeley condemned the bail
system, writing: "The Present system . . . neither guarantees
security to society nor safeguards the rights of the accused. [It
is] lax with those with whom it should be stringent and
stringent with those with whom it should be less severe." 16
Forty years later, little had changed. In an influential article
Professor Caleb Foote echoed earlier criticisms, arguing that
"such discrimination against the poor cannot survive in its
present blatant form.'m Citing studies of the bail system in
Philadelphia and New York in the late 1950's, as well as
several other studies in the early 1960's, commentators wrote:
These probes disclosed the dismal picture of a system which
trades freedom for money. Each year, in federal and state
courts, thousands of persons were held in jail for weeks or
months awaiting trial solely because they could not raise
money to pay bondsmen. Even when low bail of $500 or
$1,000 was set, a $50 or $100 bond premium was more than
many defendants could afford. Left behind in the wake of
detention were lost jobs, abandoned homes, families destitute
and without support, lawyers hobbled in preparing cases for
trial. The chances for acquittal, or for probation if convicted,
diminished. Dead time in jail awaiting trial sometimes
exceeded sentence after conviction, and often was ignored in
the computation of jail terms. 18

Another theme was the way in which the bail bond system
resulted in a transfer of control over the release process from
the judiciary to private individuals. In a Supreme Court case
upholding the Illinois Ten Percent Cash Bail System, Mr.
Justice Blackmun wrote:
Prior to 1964 the professional bail bondsman system with all
its abuses was in full and odorous bloom in Illinois. Under
that system, the bail bondsman customarily collected the
maximum fee (10% of the amount of the bond) permitted by
statute, and retained that entire amount even though the
accused fully satisfied the conditions of the bond. Payment of

16

ARTHUR BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO (1966).

17

Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REV.

959, 999 (1965).
18
Patricia M. Wald & Daniel J. Freed, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: A
Practitioner's Primer, 52 A.B.A.J. 940-41 (1966).
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this substantial "premium" was required of the good risk as
well as of the bad. The results were that a heavy and
irretrievable burden fell upon the accused, to the excellent
profit of the bondsman, and that professional bondsmen, and
not the courts, exercised significant control over the actual
workings of the bail system. 19

In his dissenting opinion m the same case, Mr. Justice
Douglas noted that:
The commercial bail bondsman has long been an anathema to
the criminal defendant seeking to exercise his right to pretrial
release. In theory, the courts were to set such amounts and
conditions of bonds as were necessary to secure the
appearance of defendants at trial. Those who did not have the
resources to post their own bond were at the mercy of the
bondsman who could exact exorbitant fees and unconscionable
conditions for acting as surety. Criminal defendants often
paid more in fees to bondsmen for securing their release than
they were later to pay in penalties for their crime.~ 0

In a noted case from the D.C. Circuit, Judge Bazelon
observed that the defendant may have no real financial stake
in appearing in court, since it is the bondsman that decides
whether to require collateral, and the court does not decide, or
even know, if a given bond means a greater stake and a greater
incentive not to flee. 21 Under the old system of personal
sureties, the surety's standing up for a defendant was seen as
testimonial to the defendant's good character. However, a
commercial bail bondsman may prefer the repeat business of a
career criminal, as long as he pays his fees and shows up for
trial.
These were the practices that the early bail reforms set out
to change. The first "experiments," viewed as revolutionary at
the time, seem quaintly modest in retrospect. The bail projects
of the mid 1960's set out to test a simple hypothesis-that some
defendants could be released and would return to court without
the payment of a bondsman's premium. Not surprisingly, the
hypothesis was borne out. Statistics indicated that defendants
released through the intervention of bail projects were just as

19

Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 359-60 (1971) (citation omitted).
ld. at 373-74 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
21
Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting).
20
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likely to appear in court as were defendants released after
payment of bond. 22
The bail reform movement received a boost when the U.S.
Department of Justice and the Vera Foundation co-sponsored
the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice in 1964
for the purpose of focusing "nationwide attention on the defects
in the bail system, the success of experiments in improving it,
and the problems remaining in its reform."23 Convened by
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, with an opening address
by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the conference "for the first time
exposed the scope and depth of the bail problem to a national
audience of over 400 judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers,
police, bondsmen, and prison officials."24
As a direct outgrowth of the National Bail Conference,
Congress added to the momentum of reform by passing
sweeping legislation for the federal system known as the Bail
Reform Act of 1966. 25 This law created a presumption in favor
of release on the least restrictive conditions reasonably
calculated to assure the defendant's appearance in court. The
impact of the new federal bail statute was significant. The
language of the law served as a model, as many states set
about to amend and reform their own bail statutes.
The 1966 Bail Reform Act was not without its critics,
however. A number of commentators believed that the single
purpose of the new act - to assure appearance in court - was
too limited. "Crime on bail" was perceived to be a growing
problem, and some believed that protection of public safety
should be an explicit purpose of "bail."26 Adherents of this

22
See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, PUB. No. R0016, AN EVALUATION
OF POLICY RELATED RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRETRIAL RELEASE
PROGRAMS (1975).
23
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Letter of Transmittal introducing PROCEEDINGS
AND INTERIM REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE at iv (U.S. Dep't of Justice & The Vera Foundation, co-sponsors, 1965)
(hereinafter PROCEEDINGS].
24
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 23, at xiv.
25
18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-46 (1988).
26
Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in a hearing before the Subcommittee
stated:

Since its enactment, the Bail Reform Act has proved to be a great step
forward
in
Federal
criminal
procedure.
Notwithstanding these
improvements, the act has not fully accomplished the purposes for which
it was designed . . . . One major problem is that the provisions of the act
which restrict the imposition of money bail and which require that any

380

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 5

position argued that public safety was in fact a consideration in
every release decision, and that the law should, therefore,
permit the Court to consider it openly - either through the use
of restrictive release conditions or by outright "preventive
detention." While attempts to amend the Federal Bail Reform
Act in 1968 failed, these concepts were incorporated into the
District of Columbia criminal code two years later. Thus, the
District of Columbia became the first jurisdiction with a
statutory procedure for detaining without bond certain
defendants believed to pose threats to community safety.
Significantly, the new bail/detention statute retained the
"presumption in favor of release" that was the hallmark of the
Federal Bail Reform Act.
Presently, in the District of Columbia, to hold a defendant
under "preventive detention," several specific judicial findings
are required. One key finding is that no condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably assure community
safety. 27 Thus, even if a defendant is found, based on past
behavior, to pose a threat to community safety, release is still
required unless the Court makes a specific, written, and
appealable finding that no conditions can be imposed to protect
the community. This concept - that even demonstrably
"dangerous" defendants are entitled to pretrial release if their
release can be safely supervised- is important to the position
of this article, that drug testing is an essential component in
completing the bail reform effort begun a generation ago.
Although controversial, the constitutionality of the
detention statute was eventually upheld by the D.C. Court of
Appeals. 28 Within 15 years, many states had adopted
amendments to their own bail laws permitting judges to

pretrial detention be justified in writing by the judicial officer as
necessary to prevent flight to avoid prosecution have resulted in the
release of many allegedly dangerous defendants who previously could have
been detained extra-legally by setting high money bail. This has led many
persons to suggest that the act be amended to authorize expressly the
outright detention of defendants considered to represent a high risk of
further criminal conduct, as well as those considered to represent a high
risk of flight.
AMENDMENTS TO THE BAIL REFORM ACT m' 1966, REPORT OF HEARINGS BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969).
27
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1991).
28
United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. dented, 455 U.S.
1022 (1982).
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consider community safety in bail determinations. In 1984,
Congress passed sweeping amendments to the federal bail laws
in the new Bail Reform Act of 1984. 29 The Constitutionality of
this law was upheld by the Supreme Court three years later in
the case of United States v. Salerno. 30
Ill.

A ''MODEL" SYSTEM OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE

Encouraged by their initial successes, the early bail
reformers set about to institutionalize and complete the
revolution they had begun. Program directors and
administrators representing a wide diversity of pretrial reform
efforts organized themselves into the first professional
association, the National Association of Pretrial Services
Agencies, in 1972. 31 At this point, the concept of pretrial
services was still in the formative stages. The early "pioneers"
of the movement represented a wide diversity of programs,
whose only common denominator seemed to be a willingness to
try anything to make the pretrial phase of the criminal justice
system work better.
Gradually, the field began to coalesce around a set of
principles and beliefs regarding the way pretrial defendants
should be "processed" through the criminal justice system. A
number of criminal justice groups undertook projects to develop
"standards" for different aspects of the justice system. 32 In
1976, The National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies
(NAPSA), with financial support from the U.S. Department of
Justice, initiated a two year project to develop "standards and
goals" for pretrial release programs and pretrial diversion
programs. Working independently, the American Bar
Association also developed criminal justice standards for
pretrial release incorporating many of the same principles. 33
29

18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-46 (1988).
107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
31
Program directors at the first meetings of the National Association of
Pretrial Services Agencies represented VISTA volunteers, anti-poverty programs
funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, church groups, revolving bail funds,
pretrial diversion programs, programs dedicated to fmding jobs for defendants,
"own recognizance" programs, and heroin addiction treatment programs. Conference
Proceedings of the First Annual Conference of the National Association of Pretrial
Services Agencies (March 14-16, 1973) (on file with author).
32
Among the organizations producing standards were the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice, the American Bar Association, and the National
District Attorneys Association.
33
For a comparison of these two sets of standards, see RoSEANNA KAPLAN,
30
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These two sets of standards were intended to represent an
"ideal" system of pretrial release decision-making.
In formulating standards for pretrial release, both the ABA
and NAPSA adopted the view that public safety is a factor in
almost every release decision (whether or not articulated) and
that therefore the consideration of this factor should be open
and governed by strict procedural safeguards. A "model"
system, then, would permit public danger to be considered
explicitly, but end the use of money bonds as the means for
accomplishing "sub rosa" preventive detention. 34 Briefly, then,
a model system of pretrial justice begins with a presumption in
favor of pretrial release. 35 The presumption in favor of release
on personal recognizance must be overcome in order to impose
restrictive conditions of release. 36 If conditions of release are
to be imposed, they must be the least restrictive conditions
required to assure the appearance of the defendant or protect
the safety of the community. 37 In determining conditions of
release, the court should follow an ordered progression, from
least restrictive conditions for "low risk" individuals to more
restrictive conditions for higher risk individuals. Even
defendants with prior convictions for dangerous acts are
entitled to pretrial liberty if conditions can be imposed which
will reasonably assure the safety to the community. For the
cases posing the highest potential risk, such conditions might
well include placement in a halfway house, regular drug
monitoring, and participation in a drug treatment program.
One of the cornerstones of the "model" system of pretrial
decision-making is the abolition of the use of monetary

PRETRIAL SERVICES RESOURCE CENTER, A COMPARISON OF PRETRIAL RELEASE
STANDARDS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES (1983).
34
"Sub rosa" preventive detention refers to the practice of setting a high bond
ostensibly to assure return to court, but in reality to detain the defendant.
35
See PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND GoALS FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE, Standard
I (National Assoc. of Pretrial Services Agencies 1978) [hereinafter NAPSA RELEASE
STANDARDS]. See also STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, Standard 10-1.1. (American Bar Association 1980) [herinafter ABA
STANDARDS].
36
NAPSA RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 35, Standard IV.
37
Although adopted in 1978, long before drug testing gained popularity as a
monitoring technique, the NAPSA Release Standards specifically mentioned, by way
of example, the condition that the defendant "refrain from the use of alcohol or
drugs, undergo treatment for drug addiction or alcoholism, and/or submit to
periodic testing." NAPSA RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 35, Standard IV-C-8
(emphasis added).
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conditions of release. For decades, money had been the means
by which judges sought (sometimes unsuccessfully) to detain
defendants believed not to merit release. Even when judges
believed that a low bond would lead to release, this did not
always happen. Thus the use of monetary bonds often
frustrated the intentions of the court, and at the very least did
not promote the kind of careful assessment of the potential
"dangerousness" of a defendant that both the community and
the defendant were entitled to expect. Therefore, holding true
to the early ideals of the bail reform movement, the pretrial
association went on record in 1978 calling for the complete end
to all forms of money bond. 38
Acknowledging that some defendants would simply not be
released, the NAPSA recognized that an alternative mechanism
for pretrial detention would have to exist in any credible
"model" of pretrial justice. Standards describing a pretrial
detention procedure were developed. 39 The model procedure
places limits on the kinds of defendants eligible for pretrial
detention, stressing that one of the requisite judicial findings is
that there are no conditions that will "reasonably minimize the
substantial risk of flight," 40 or "the substantial risk of danger
to the community."41
A model system of pretrial decision-making envisions a
continuation of the long-recognized presumption in favor of
release, an end to monetary conditions of release, and a more
honest and accountable process for determining which
arrestees are to be locked up pending trial. If such a system
were ever codified, it would, in the opinion of some bail reform
advocates, at last eliminate the abuses inherent in our money
bond system. It would bring pretrial release or detention
practices into the light of day where the basis of a prosecutor's
conclusion that a defendant is "dangerous" or flight prone
would be subject to scrutiny in a due process hearing.
Conditions of release take on major importance in this scheme,

38
NAPSA RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 35, Standard V, states: "The use
of financial conditions of release should be eliminated." The ABA standards did not
go as far, but did state: "[c]ompensated sureties should be abolished." ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 35, Standard 10-5.5, and that "Monetary conditions should
be set only when it is found that no other conditions on release will reasonably
assure the defendant's appearance in court." !d., Standard 10-5.4.
39
NAPSA RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 35, Standard VII.
40
NAPSA RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 35, Standard VII(A)(1).
41
NAPSA RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 35, Standard VII(A)(2).
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as even dangerous defendants are entitled to pretrial release if
that release can be safely supervised. As will be discussed in
Section V, an understanding of this conceptual framework is
crucial to the position of this article that pretrial drug testing
is an essential step in bail reform.
To a large degree, the bail reform movement, begun with
such excitement and anticipation in the mid 1960s, is a
revolution that has stalled in mid-stream. Progress has been
made here and there, but by and large, pretrial practices in
many jurisdictions operate as they have for decades. Only one
state-Kentucky-has outlawed bail bonding for profit. 42
Some states have adopted cash deposit bail systems, effectively
eliminating bail bondsmen, yet retaining money bonds and all
of the inequities associated with financial conditions of
release. 43 Most states and the federal system have adopted
pretrial detention laws, but have not eliminated financial
conditions of release. 44 Thus, rather than changing the
mechanism for making release/detention decisions, legislatures
have simply added a new procedure without eliminating the old
one. There has been little pressure to change the structure of
pretrial release decision making. Many of the inequities
chronicled by Arthur Beeley more than half a century ago,
remain with us today. 45

42

Comprehensive bail reform was accomplished in Kentucky in February,
1976, through the enactment of KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.510-550 (Baldwin 1991),
which abolished the practice of bail bonding for profit, and required all trial courts
to provide pretrial release and investigation services in lieu of commercial bail
bondsmen. The establishment of the Pretrial Services Agency and guidelines to
facilitate the pretrial release process were accomplished by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky through revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to bail. KY.
R.C.P. 4.00-4.58.
43
D. ALAN HENRY, PRETRIAL SERVICES RESOURCE CENTER, TEN PERCENT
DEPOSIT BAIL (1990).
44
The futility of this approach has been documented in a study: GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-88-6, CRIMINAL BAIL: How BAIL REFORM IS
WORKING IN SELECTED DISTRICT COURTS (1987) [hereinafter CRIMINAL BAIL]. In
examining the effect of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, the study found that
after the law went into effect, detention rates went up, failure-to-appear rates
remained very low under the old and the new law (around 2%), and re-arrest rates
also remained very low (1.8% under the old law and 0.8% under the new law).
Finally, in direct opposition to the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (1988)
("the judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in ...
detention ... "), fully half of the detained defendants were detained because they
could not afford the bail. In two districts the percentage was even higher.
45
BEELEY, supra note 16.
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DRUGS, CRIME, AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM

The premise of this article is that drug testing is an
essential step in completing the bail reform revolution. This
argument rests on four pillars: (1) the close association between
drug abuse and criminal behavior; (2) the extent of drug
dependency among criminal justice or "offender" populations;
(3) the effectiveness of drug testing in identifying drug users
and assessing risk; and finally, (4) the usefulness of drug
testing as a monitoring technique for pretrial defendants.

A.

The Drug I Crime Association

The close association between heavy drug use and criminal
behavior is now beyond question. A large body of literature
exists on heroin addiction and its connection to criminal behavior, and more recent studies are now appearing on the association between criminal behavior and other drugs, such as
"crack" cocaine. 46 Some of the most thorough studies of heroin addicts have demonstrated that addiction tends to be a long
term, chronic affliction, and that most addicts persist in high
levels of criminal behavior for many years, despite periods of
incarceration or treatment. Many studies have focused on the
high correlation between heroin addiction and property
crime, 47 and have established that addiction to heroin is followed by increases in these crimes. In studies of "career criminals" by the Rand Corporation, most of the inmates classified
as "violent predators" among inmates in three states had histories of heroin use in combination with other drugs and alcohol.
Among all factors analyzed, in fact, a history of drug abuse was
one of the best indicators or predictors of high-rate criminal
behavior. 48 Other studies have confirmed that arrestees using

46

James A. lnciardi & Anne E. Pottieger, Kids, Crack, and Crime, 21 JoUR·
NAL OF DRUG IssUES 257 (1991). "In conclusion," write the authors, "the crack·
crime dynamic, at least for adolescent crack dealers, represents an intensified
version of the classic drug-crime relationship originally described for (adult) heroin
users. Both patterns rest on addiction, but for crack, addiction onset appears to
be more rapid while maximum physiological--and thus financial requirements--seem
more unlimited." ld. at 269.
47
For a description of a longitudinal study of heroin addicts in Baltimore,
Maryland, see John C. Ball et al., The Criminality of Heroin Addicts--When Addicted and When Off Opiates, in THE DRUGS-CRIME CONNECTION 39-66 (James A.
Inciardi ed., 1981).
48
JAN M. CHAIKEN & MARCIA R. CHAIKEN, VARIETIES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
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drugs heavily are more likely to be committing crimes at very
high (over 100 annually) rates. 49
Given the correlation between high rates of drug abuse and
high rates of criminality, the question often arises as to the
types of crimes associated with drug use. Are most drug users
involved in the kinds of income-generating or drug distribution
crimes needed to "support a habit?" Or are high rate drug abusers also involved with other kinds of violent crime as well?
While more research needs to be done on this issue, some data
suggests that ''heroin-using offenders are just as likely as their
non-drug using or non-heroin using counterparts to commit violent crimes (such as homicide, sexual assault, and arson), and
even more likely to commit robbery and weapons offenses."50
This theme-that drug use and criminal behavior are
closely related among offender populations-is supported by
many other studies. Looking at arrestees, for example, a study
of self-reported drug use in the District of Columbia from 19791981 established that drug users released before trial were
twice as likely to be rearrested than were non-users. 51 And in
a more comprehensive evaluation of a program of pretrial drug
testing in the District of Columbia using data from 1984,
arrestees testing positive for one drug were more likely to be
rearrested before trial, and arrestees testing positive for two or
more drugs even more likely to be rearrested. 52 Similar findings have been reported from a sample of 2606 arrestees processed through the Manhattan Criminal Courts in New York City. 53

64 (1982).
49
BRUCE D. JOHNSON & ERIC D. WISH, NARCOTIC AND DRUG RESEARCH, INC.,
CRIME RATES AMONG DRUG-ABUSING OFFENDERS, FINAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (1986).
50
BERNARD A. GROPPER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBING THE LINKS BETWEEN
DRUGS AND CRIME (National Inst. of Justice, Research in Brief, February 1985).
51
MARY A. TOBORG & MICHAEL P. KIRBY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 94073,
DRUG USE AND PRETRIAL CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (National Inst. of
Justice, Research in Brief, October 1984).
52
See Anthony M.J. Yezer et a!., The Efficacy of Using Urine-Testing Results
in Risk Classification, in ASSESSMENT OF PRETRIAL URINE TESTING IN THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA (Toborg Associates, Inc. eds., National Institute of Justice Monograph
No. 6, 1987). For a general overview of this program, see John A. Carver, Drugs
and Crime: Controlling Use and Reducing Risk Through Testing, NATIONAL INST.
OF JuST. REP., SNI 199, September/October 1986, at 2.
53
Douglas A. Smith et a!., Drug Use and Pretrial Misconduct in New York
City, 5 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 101 (1989). The study concluded that "(T]he
percentage [of defendants] who fail, by either FTA or rearrest, increases with the
number of positive test results." Id. at 109. "The data indicate that the number of
drugs a person tests positive for is related to the probability of FTA and rearrest,
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Just as drug addiction has been shown to be associated
with very high rates of criminal activity, there is also considerable evidence for a corollary hypothesis-that reductions in
drug use correspond with reductions in criminal behavior. 54
This observation is valid even when the reductions in drug use
are non-voluntary, such as when drug-dependent offenders are
"coerced" into treatment as a condition of probation or parole.55 Finally, there is also considerable evidence for the proposition that the longer an addict remains in treatment, the better the outcome in terms of "drug free" days. 56
These addiction studies have powerful implications for the
criminal justice system. The most drug-dependent individuals
are those most likely to commit crimes and at some point come
under the jurisdiction of the court. The criminal justice system
has significant power over criminal defendants, probationers,
and parolees. This power is exercised by imposing conditions of
pretrial release or conditions of probation backed up by the
threat of sanctions (including incarceration) for violations of
these conditions or contempt of court orders. To summarize, the
most dysfunctional drug abusers tend to be the most crimeprone individuals who are already under the jurisdiction of the
court. Thus, the court has existing authority to require treateven after controlling for other factors typically available to the judge at the time
of the pretrial release decision." !d. at 123.
54
William H. McGlothlin et al., A Follow-up of Admissions to the California
Civil Addict Program, 4 AM. J. OF DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE 179 (1977).
55
Carl G. Leukefeld & Frank M. Tims, Compulsory Treatment: A Review of
Findings, in COMPULSORY DRUG ABUSE: RESEARCH AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 247
(National Institute on Drug Abuse Research Monograph No. 86, 1988). Writing in
the same monograph, M. Douglas Anglin notes:
The general conclusion . . . is that civil commitment and other drug
treatment initiatives . . . are effective ways to reduce narcotics addiction
and to minimize the adverse social effects associated with it. How an
individual is exposed to treatment seems to be irrelevant. What is important is that the narcotics addict must be brought into an environment
where intervention can occur over time. Civil commitment and other
legally coercive measures are useful and proven strategies to get people
into a treatment program when they will not enter voluntarily. The use
of such measures . . . could produce significant individual and social benefits.
M. Douglas Anglin, The Efficacy of Civil Commitment in Treating Narcotic Addiction, in COMPULSORY DRUG ABUSE: RESEARCH AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 8, 31 (National Institute of Drug Abuse Research Monograph No. 86, 1988).
56
NATIONAL ASS'N OF STATE ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE DIRECTORS, THE
TRAGIC COST OF UNDER-VALUING TREATMENT IN THE "DRUG WAR". A REVIEW OF 15
YEARS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS ON ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT
OUTCOMES (1990).
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ment. Involuntary or coerced treatment is effective because it
keeps drug-dependent individuals in treatment longer. Court
intervention can reduce drug use which can lead to corresponding reductions in crime.

B. Extent of Drug Dependency Among Criminal Justice Populations
Criminal Justice practitioners have long recognized that
society's drug-dependent members are well represented among
arrestee and offender populations. This recognition has been
supported by statistics on drug arrests, government sponsored
surveys of prison inmates, 57 and research projects. 58 To a certain extent, all of these efforts to quantify the extent of drug
dependency among "offender" populations were "educated
guesses," hampered by methodological uncertainties. Many of
these attempts to estimate drug use prevalence rates relied on
interviews of inmates. Even in research interview settings with
guarantees of confidentiality, there is a certain degree of underreporting about crimes and drug use. Rates of "sampling bias"
are further compounded by a variety of factors in criminal case
processing.
It has only been within the last four years that policy makers have been able to gain a much clearer picture of the extent
of drug abuse currently flooding the system. The DUF, funded
by the National Institute of Justice, is a quarterly sampling of
arrestees in twenty-three cities. The survey consists of both a
confidential interview consisting of a series of questions on
current and past drug use, age of first use, treatment history,
and other data. Unlike other drug abuse prevalence indicators,59 subjects of this survey are requested to provide a urine

67

See, e.g., Prisoners and Drugs, 1983 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN NCJ-87575 (reporting that "almost a third of all State prisoners in 1979 were
under the influence of an illegal drug when they committed the crimes for which
they were incarcerated."); see also Allen J. Beck, Profile of Jail Inmates, 1989, 1991
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT NCJ-129097 (reporting that "inmates . . . in jail for drug violations increased from 9.3% of the population in 1983
to 23% in 1989," and that "during the month before their offense, more than 4 of
every 10 convicted inmates in 1989 had used a drug-more than 1 of every 4 were
users of a major drug.").
58
For an excellent compilation of scientific studies in this area, see CRIMINAL
CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1986).
69
Other indicators include the High School Senior Survey, the National
Household Survey, and the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN). For an overview and description of these and other indicators, see OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG

371]

AN ESSENTIAL STEP IN BAIL REFORM

389

sample, which is then tested for the presence of ten drugs of
abuse, with the results correlated with the data from the interview instrument. To the initial surprise of many, the arrestee
population is thoroughly saturated with drugs. 60 While the
percent positive for drugs varies from city to city, it is consistently over 50% in all sites surveyed. According to the 1989
Drug Use Forecasting Annual Report, 61 the percentage of
males testing positive for any drug ranged from a low of 53% in
San Antonio, to a high of 82% in San Diego. In eight of the
seventeen cities surveyed, in 1989, 70% or more of the female
arrestees tested positive for a drug. A subsequent study using
DUF data estimated that "cocaine use in arrestees in the prior
2-3 days (based on the urinalysis) was 17 to 25 times greater
than the use in the past month found in the general
population.... These differences would be even greater if the
window of detection for the urine tests extended to the prior 30
days." 62
Drug use may be declining among the general population,
but heavy or chronic use is still substantial. 63 These individuals are concentrated in the criminal justice system, as the DUF
results amply demonstrate. 64 Moreover, the heavily-dependent

CONTROL POLICY, WHITE PAPER SIN 040-000-00547-1, LEADING DRUG INDICATORS
(1990).
60
See infra Appendix, Tables I-VI for statistics on booked arrestees testing
positive for specific drugs.
61
Drugs and Crime, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 1989 DRUG USE
FORECASTING ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1990).
62
Eric D. Wish, U.S. Drug Policy in the 1990s: Insights from New Data from
Arrestees, 25 INTERNATIONAL J. OF THE ADDICTIONS 377, 387 (1990) (emphasis in
original).
63
A recent report prepared for use by the Committee on the Judiciary of the
United States Senate concluded that "there are 2.4 million hard-core cocaine
addicts--about 1 out of every 100 Americans." STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., DRUG USE IN AMERICA: Is THE EPIDEMIC REALLY OVER? 23 (Comm. Print 1990). The report further found that "the national
total of hard-core heroin addicts is 940,000, nearly twice the Administration's
official estimate of 500,000. The Administration relies only on the Household
Survey of Drug Abuse. Our data from many sources--including the Justice Department and state drug treatment centers--indicate a much higher total: 940,000. Id.
at 30. See also Michael lsikoff, Hospital Data Indicate Rise in Hard-Core Drug
Abuse, WASH. POST, May 13, 1992, at A-1 ("The federal government's Drug Abuse
Warning Network (DAWN), considered a key indicator for measuring trends in
hard-core drug abuse, reported yesterday there were 28,700 cocaine-related visits to
hospital emergency rooms from July through September 1991, a 13 percent increase over the previous three months and nearly 46 percent higher than the
comparable period in 1990.").
64
See Drugs and Crime, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 1989 DRUG USE
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drug users tend to be the most dysfunctional, most troublesome
individuals, causing a disproportionate share of criminal
acts. 65 Finally, the concentration of drug addicts in the criminal justice system is nothing new, but has been prevalent for
many years. 66
The close association between drug use and criminal behavior, coupled with the knowledge that reductions in drug use
lead to corresponding reductions in criminal behavior, suggest
two important reasons for conducting pretrial drug testing.
First, the knowledge that there is an association (not necessarily a causal relationship) between drug use and crime means
that knowledge about drug use is potentially useful for judges
in assessing pretrial release eligibility. Second, to the extent
that court "coercion" can be effective in reducing drug use and
bringing about a corresponding reduction in criminality, drug
testing (possibly coupled with treatment) offers the promise of
improved monitoring pending final case disposition. Just how
effective is a positive drug test result in assessing a defendant's
likelihood of pretrial misconduct? The following section examines this question.

C.

Drug Testing as a Means of Assessing Risk

One of the most basic functions of a pretrial services agency is to assist judicial officers by gathering information relevant
to the first decision that must be made-whether, and under
what conditions, to release a defendant pending trial. Since the
earliest experimental pretrial programs were initiated in the
1960s, program personnel have questioned defendants about a
variety of factors believed to be useful in assessing the
defendant's potential for returning to court, and, more recently,
avoiding rearrests. These factors have traditionally included
FORECASTING ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1990); Drugs and Crime, in NATIONAL INSfiTUTE
OF JUSf!CE, 1989 DRUG USE FORECASTING ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1991); Eric D. Wish,
U.S. Drug Policy in the 1990s: Insights from New Data from Arrestees, 25 INTERNATIONAL J. OF THE ADDICTIONS 377 (1990). Dr. Wish notes: "The data that we have
presented indicate that some of the most serious drug use can be found in persons
being detained and monitored by the criminal justice system. As many as one half
of the frequent cocaine users in the United States are contained in the arrestee
population." ld. at 385.
••
GROPPER, supra note 50.
66
Herman Joseph, The Criminal Justice System and Opiate Addiction: A
Historical Perspective, in COMPULSORY TREATMENT OF DRUG ABUSE: RESEARCH AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE 106 (National Institute of Drug Abuse Research Monograph No.
86, 1988).
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length of time in the community and at a given address, employment status, family ties, prior criminal history, and drug
use. Deficiencies in any of these areas typically result in a lower "score" in the program's risk assessment instrument. Verification or corroboration of information supplied by the defendant is important, with verified information resulting in a more
favorable recommendation.
In the area of drugs, virtually all programs ask the defendant about possible drug use and drug treatment status. Unlike residence information, drug use information (or more specifically, denials about drug involvement) have been difficult to
verify. Drug testing offers the possibility of providing the Court
with scientifically verified and objective information about the
existence of drugs in the defendant's system shortly after arrest.
To obtain this information, two teams of staff of the D.C.
Pretrial Services Agency enter the courthouse cellblock every
morning. One team conducts the traditional pretrial interview,
asking defendants where they live, work, whether they have
been arrested before, whether they use drugs, and so forth.
Another team collects urine samples from each arrestee. Prior
to collecting the sample, the staff member identifies himself,
requests a urine sample, explains the purpose for the request
and the limitations on the use of the results. 67 Only about two
percent of the defendants approached refuse to give a sample.68 Samples are transported immediately to the Agency's

67

Agency procedures require the staff member to give the following warning
before collecting a urine sample:
My name is
and I work for the Pretrial Services
Agency. I am here to collect a urine sample from you. You do not have
to give a sample, but if you do, the sample will be tested for drugs and
the results given to the judge or hearing commissioner for use at your
bail hearing. The test results will be used only to determine conditions of
release in your case. They cannot be used to determine whether you are
guilty or innocent of today's charges. If you choose not to provide a sample, the Court may order you to provide one if and when you are released.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCY, TRAINING AND PROCEDURE
MANUAL 159 (1991).
68

Monthly Collection Rate Statistics Assembled by Michael Gunn, Supervisor,
Adult Drug Detection Unit (Jan. - Dec. 1991) (on file with author). The low refusal
rate is surprising to some, but perhaps can be explained by the common realization among defendants (many of whom have been through the system before) that
even a positive result will not be the determining factor in the judge's release
decision. Indeed, refusing to provide a sample will generally result in a court-or-
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on-site lab, where they are analyzed for the presence of five
drugs. 69 The drug results are then incorporated into the
Agency's recommendation and made available to the judicial
officer in arraignment court.
One of the empirical questions of great interest to program
administrators was the usefulness of a drug test at this stage
for risk assessment purposes. The National Institute of Justice
sponsored an independent evaluation of the pretrial drug testing program of the District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency. This evaluation looked at several research questions, including the question of the efficacy of using drug test results in risk
classification of arrestees. This study, conducted by the research firm of Toborg Associates, found that "urine test results
make a consistent, significant, incremental contribution to risk
classification for arrestees in the District of Columbia." 70 In
other words, looking at rearrests and failures-to-appear as the
outcome measures, urine tests improved pretrial risk classification over and above the factors already in use for this purpose,
such as community ties and prior criminal record. A separate
evaluation of data from the D.C. program concluded that
the most striking result in these analyses is the size of the
risk multiplier associated with a positive drug test result. For
subjects testing positive for a single drug other than PCP, the
rearrest risk in the early weeks after release is three to four
times as great as their drug-negative counterparts; and if two
drugs are involved, it is nearly five times as great. 71

D. Drug Testing as a Monitoring Technique
If the first priority of a pretrial services agency is to advise
the court on a defendant's release eligibility, the second priority
must be to supervise the release conditions once they are imposed by the judge. When the D.C. Pretrial Services Agency

dered condition to provide one after release for purposes of evaluation, and if
positive, to submit to regular testing. Many defendants may conclude that there is
really nothing to be gained by refusing to provide a sample when first approached.
69
The five drugs are: cocaine, opiates, methadone, amphetamines, and PCP.
70
MARY A. TOBORG ET AL., U.S. DEp'T OF JUSTICE, ASSESSMENT OF PRETRIAL
URINE TESTING IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 10 (National lnst. of Justice, Issues
and Practices, December 1989) (emphasis omitted).
71
Yezer et al., supra note 52, at 10 (citing Christy Visher & Richard Linster,
A Survival Model of Pretrial Failure, Draft Discussion Paper Presented at the 1988
Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology 23 (Nov. 9-12, 1988)).
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began its drug testing program in 1984, a key component of the
program was the introduction of drug testing as a condition of
release. Recognizing that there was little value in identifying
drug users unless the agency could recommend a release option
to address the problem, the Agency devised a monitoring program with clear goals, and set about to evaluate it. 72
Among the research questions investigated by the independent evaluator, Toborg Associates, was the usefulness of periodic urine testing as a post-release monitoring technique. To
examine this question, drug-positive releasees were randomly
assigned to one of three groups. One group was placed in periodic urine testing only; a second group was referred for treatment to the citywide drug abuse treatment agency; and a third
group served as a "control" group released with neither urine
testing nor referral to treatment. The outcome measures were:
failure to appear; rearrest on new charges; or a combination of
both, termed "pretrial misconduct."
Overall, the urine testing group performed slightly better
than either the "treatment" group or the "control" group. More
important, however, was the way in which the "drug testing"
group quickly separated itself into two sub-groups with large
differences in expected pretrial arrest rates, failure-to-appear
rates, and overall pretrial misconduct rates. The first subgroup, termed "successful participants" by the evaluators, appeared as required for drug testing. The second sub group,
dubbed "non-participants," quickly dropped out of the program.
The rearrest rate of the "successful participants" was half that
of the "non-participants." These differences appeared within
four weeks of release. This research suggests that while drugpositive defendants as a group pose greater-than-average release risks, they can nevertheless be safely released, as long as
the release is conditioned on periodic reporting for urinalysis.
Participation in the drug testing program operates as a "signal"
that the defendant possesses behavioral characteristics associated with a lower risk of pretrial misconduct. Those who "sig-

72

The goals were spelled out in various written descriptions of the program:
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the new testing program was the
development of regular drug testing as a condition of release. The goal of
this aspect of the program was simple-to reduce the use of drugs, thereby reducing (it was hoped) the increased risks of pretrial misconduct
posed by the release of drug users.
Carver, supra note 52, at 4 (emphasis in original).
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nal" their unwillingness or inability to comply with court orders
can be brought back to court for some sort of action or further
intervention.
A separate analysis of the same data validated the Toborg
findings, adding further refinement. 73 This secondary analysis
confirmed that drug-involved defendants who fail to show up
for their first drug testing appointment are more likely to be
rearrested than those who do show up as required. However,
looking only at those who do not appear, among those who had
at least three of five additional characteristics. 74 Sixty-one percent were rearrested as opposed to just twenty-one percent of
the sub-group with less than three of the identified characteristics. The author observes:
In essence, this is a two-stage classification, which is
recognized in some research on criminal behavior as a more
accurate method for assessing risk than simply trying to identify high-risk offenders among a large heterogeneous group.
The first stage is classifying the subset of defendants who fail
to show up for the first postrelease urine test as much more
likely to be rearrested than those who test negative or positive. Then, among this high-risk group, use of the five additional factors-the second stage-increases the accuracy of
identifying those defendants at risk for rearrest. 75

The policy implications of this research are quite powerful.
They suggest that even those defendants in the category of
highest statistical risk (i.e. chronic drug users with prior criminal records) can be effectively managed or supervised during
the pretrial period. This is not to suggest that the supervision,
in and of itself, is sufficient in every case, or even in most cases. It does suggest that many defendants can be safely released
before trial, if such release is conditioned on periodic drug
testing. With the drug testing capability, the research suggests
that defendants will quickly sort themselves into two subgroups: those who comply, and those who don't. Those who do
not or cannot comply (especially when non-compliance occurs in

73

Christy Visher, Using Drug Testing to Identify High-Risk Defendants on Release: A Study in the District of Columbia, 18 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 321, 325 (1990).
74
The "five additional characteristics were: (1) defendant initially arrested for
a felony (as opposed to a misdemeanor); (2) positive test result at arrest for heroin
and cocaine; (3) at least one prior adult conviction; (4) the defendant was male;
and (5) defendant was unemployed at the time of the arrest." !d. at 328.
75
Visher, supra note 73, at 229 (footnotes omitted).
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conjunction with several easily-identifiable risk factors) are
statistically much more likely to be rearrested. Since these
defendants have violated a court order, the court can then
impose more restrictive conditions of release or revoke release. 76 In short, the monitoring capability permits the court
to release a larger number of cases, and then concentrate its
resources on those who fail to abide by the terms of that release.
V.

DRUG ABUSE AND A MODEL SYSTEM OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE

True bail reform will not be accomplished until all forms of
money bail are abolished. As long as money bail persists, it
provides a quick and expedient way to avoid tough decisions.
The money bail system is quick and easy. It does not require
any kind of a hearing other than that required to set the
amount. It puts off until another day the consequences of the
decision. If, at some later date, the defendant's "friends" somehow come up with the cash to bail him out, then that "release
decision" is not one taken by any actors in the system. The
defendant's release does not occur before the eyes of reporters
in the audience. The fact that the defendant posted the bond
may not even be known to the judge or the prosecutor, except
as possibly a computer entry should anyone bother to look.
Attempts to impose accountability and fairness (by requiring
detention hearings) without eliminating financial conditions of
release have failed. 77

76
Courts have broad authority to enforce their orders through a variety of
mechanisms. Additional release conditions can be imposed in response to a violation. These additional conditions might take the form of increased frequency of
testing, referral to treatment, enrollment in a residential treatment program, or
possibly placement in a halfway house. Courts can also invoke their inherent
powers to enforce their orders, convening a hearing at which the defendant is
required to "show cause" why he or she should not be held in contempt of court
for violating the order. See Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M.,
& O.R., 266 U.S. 42 (1924) ("[T]he power to punish for contempts is inherent in all
courts, has been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is
essential to the administration of justice."). In the District of Columbia, a separate
provision of the law, D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1329 (1991), spells out "penalties for
violation of conditions of release," and states that "A person who has been conditionally released . . . and who has violated a condition of relEase shall be subject
to revocation of release, an order of detention, and prosecution for contempt of
court."
77
Prior to passing the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, which authorized
pretrial detention based on dangerousness in the federal system, Congress considered eliminating financial conditions of release. In one of the Senate Reports
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As state and local governments face ever-tightening budgets, they can no longer afford to operate inefficiently in any
sphere. Inefficiencies in the criminal justice system are especially costly. These costs are really a two-edged sword. On the
one side, are the escalating costs in the budgets of corrections
departments. To the extent that inefficiencies result in higher
detention costs, the fiscal impact is staggering. 78 On the other
side is the cost to public safety and welfare. To the extent that
system inefficiencies result in the release of chronic drug abusers without the system knowing they are chronic users, and
without imposing proper controls through drug testing and
treatment, we now know that some of these individuals will
persist in committing crimes at very high rates.
Because of the fact that both of these "costs" to the community are becoming intolerable, more and more jurisdictions are
looking for ways to bring efficiency and accountability to pretrial release decision making. Herein lies the promise of pretrial
services and the hope for reform.
The model system envisioned by the NAPSA offers a
considering one of the many bills that was eventually enacted, the Judiciary
Committee wrote:
It is the intent of the Committee that the pretrial detention provisions of
section 3502 replace any existing practice of detaining dangerous defendants through the imposition of excessively high money bond. Because of
concern that the opportunity to use financial conditions of release to
achieve pretrial detention would provide a means of circumventing the
procedural safeguards and standard of proof requirement of a pretrial
detention provision, the Committee was urged to do away with money
bond entirely. Indeed, section 3502 of this bill as introduced did not provide for imposition of financial conditions of release. While the retention
of money bond does create the potential for such abuse, the Committee
concluded, after consideration of arguments for continuing to provide discretion to impose financial conditions of release, that the abolition of
money bond at this time would promote unnecessary controversy. Instead,
the bill assures the goal of precluding detention through use· of high money bond by stating explicitly that "[t]he judge may not impose a financial
condition that results in the detention of the person."
S. Rep. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1155 (1981) (citations omitted). The United
States General Accounting Office Report, CRIMINAL BAIL, supra note 44, at 25,
notes that the intention of Congress has been thwarted, as many defendants continue to be detained in lieu of bond, without ever having the benefit of a detention
hearing in which to challenge the presumption of dangerousness or flight, or to
insist that release options be considered before ordering detention.
78
The United States Department of Justice notes that "[prison] construction
costs typically range between $50,000 and $75,000 per bed. Additional money is
needed each year--about $10,000 to $15,000 per prisoner--to maintain, guard, and
manage prisoners." ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON CROWDING
2 (National Inst. of Justice, CRIME FILE Study Guide).
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framework for greatly improved pretrial decision making. According to this scheme, every release decision would be made
on its own merits-not on the "roll of the dice" of factors beyond the Court's control. Defendants coming before the court
would be entitled to a presumption in favor of release. Depending on the results of the background investigation by the pretrial services agency, the release decision process would follow an
ordered progression from least to most restrictive conditions of
release, tailored to that individual. In carefully limited situations, the prosecutor could invoke a detention hearing, but one
of the requisite findings before detention could be ordered
would be a judicial determination that there would be no conditions of release that could reasonably assure community safety.
Such a process brings us full circle back to drug testing. A
model system can only work if the judge has complete, relevant, and accurate information to assess the need for conditions. Drug testing is a vital element in scientifically verifying,
or corroborating, one of the most important factors relating to
the potential risk posed by the defendant's release. Just as it
would be ludicrous to take the defendant's word that he has
never previously been arrested without checking his criminal
record, so too does it appear inconsistent with the role of pretrial services as neutral fact-finder to take the defendant's word
on drug use, without a corroborating drug test.
Assuming the judge has a full and complete background
report, the question of release conditions must then be considered. A system in which criminal justice actors may no longer
take refuge behind a money bond will require a full range of
release alternatives for the full range of defendants flooding the
system. Drugs are a major factor in the criminal justice system.
Long after we have "won the drug war" in our workplaces and
in our school systems, we will still be seeing chronic, hard-core
addicts in our criminal justice system. Given what we now
know about the drug/crime association, it is difficult to imagine
a community tolerating the pretrial release of drug-abusing
defendants without proper monitoring. If the system is to realize the full potential of bail reform-a system where most defendants are released, and only a few detained after full dueprocess hearing-it must have the means to deal with our most
intractable and most persistent problem-drug abuse. Drug
testing provides the means. It is not a panacea, but a necessary
tool for managing risk among large numbers of people who are
already the responsibility of the Court by virtue of their arrest.
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CONCLUSION

The challenges facing the criminal justice system have
never been grater. Courts must process large numbers of criminal arrestees, many of whom are charged with increasingly
serious offenses. Many, if not most of these arrestees are drug
users, posing additional burdens on "the system." The devastating impact of drugs on certain communities has fueled intense political pressure which has in turn led to the enactment
of new laws restricting bail or expanding the application of
minimum mandatory sentences. Not surprisingly, all of these
factors have contributed to unprecedented jail and prison
crowding. As correctional facilities become ever more crowded,
federal lawsuits are often brought challenging as unconstitutional the conditions of confinement. These lawsuits often
result in court-ordered "caps" at certain institutions. Occasionally, entire prison systems are placed under court supervision.79
State and local governments are increasingly unable to pay
for the seemingly endless demands of the justice and correctional systems, especially when schools, police and social welfare agencies are also feeling the budget "pinch." The gap
between essential public services and the revenues needed to
support them appears to be widening. In such an environment,
public officials are being forced to re-think how their services
are delivered. There is no longer any leeway to operate inefficiently. This is especially true in criminal justice.
The dilemma facing state and local governments is exacerbated by the drug problem. As had been detailed above, we
now know a great deal about drugs, and the association between drug use and crime. We know, for example, that among
offender populations, multiple drug use is often associated with
high rates of criminal activity. We also know that drug addic79
A 1988 monograph prepared by the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation
found that:
There are now 15 states whose entire prison systems have operated under
court orders because of consent decrees or by virtue of having been deIn nine, special masters monitor corrections
clared unconstitutional.
officials' remedial programs. Masters are also at work in seven states
where individual institutions have been declared substandard. In additions, masters serve in at least 65 jail systems.

BRUCE PORTER, EDNA MCCONNELL CLARK FOUNDATION, SPECIAL MASTERS IN CORRECTIONS 4 (1988).
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tion tends to be a long term, recurring phenomenon, where
periods of relative abstinence from drugs are associated with
lowered rates of criminal activity, and vice versa. Finally, we
know that court-mandated treatment is more effective in reducing drug dependence (and lowering rates of criminality) than is
voluntary treatment, and that when court-ordered treatment is
enforced with regular drug testing, the results are even more
favorable.
On the surface, this suggests we either "incapacitate" drug
users by locking them up, or send them to quality treatment
programs and insist they stay there. On closer examination,
however, it becomes evident that no matter how attractive
either option may be, the system simply does not have the
capacity to incarcerate or treat more than a small percentage of
the problem. Given the extent of drug use among arrestees, it
is unrealistic to expect to find either a jail cell or a treatment
slot for the high volume of new cases flooding the system every
day.
What is needed is to rethink our way of doing things.
Traditionally, we have used an "all or nothing" approach. At
the various release points throughout the system, the alternatives are to release or detain. If released, the alternatives tend
to be "do nothing" or revoke release. When confronted with the
magnitude of the drug abuse problem, we can no longer afford
to use our scarce resources in such an inefficient manner. We
need to begin thinking of drug abuse among offender populations less as a "problem" in need of a "solution" and more as an
almost permanent "condition" which, it if can't be solved by the
court system, can at least be "managed" in a far more costeffective way for society.
The experience of the D.C. Pretrial Services Agency in the
monitoring of pretrial releasees through drug testing, offers
encouragement for this approach. Monitoring alone, when set
up to include quick responses to violations, has proven at least
as effective as treatment for many when one looks at overall
rates of pretrial misconduct. This is not to suggest that drug
monitoring be viewed as a substitute for drug treatment. Rather, it recognizes that both jail space and quality treatment are
expensive, scarce commodities. We should begin to look for
ways to allocate them more effectively. Ongoing drug abuse
monitoring is perhaps the best means of selecting those who
really need treatment or jail. It also is a workable means of
supervising vast numbers of releasees.
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The foundation of this strategy would be to establish strict
accountability with respect to drug use among all "drug offenders" under the supervision of the court system. A variety of
responses (including treatment and jail) would be employed in
a dynamic process to establish this accountability. Such a
strategy would have to include the following elements:
Comprehensive drug testing and monitoring, beginning
at the point of arrest, and continuing through probation
or parole.
Greater use of existing drug testing and computer technology, whereby subjects await the outcome of each urine
test, and are provided with immediate feedback as the
results.
A system whereby the individual would not only be confronted immediately with the drug test results, but
would face immediate consequences.
A contingency management approach, where specific
responses would 'be used to impose sanctions for violations, or to reward compliance. The sanctioning philosophy would be based on graduated and escalating responses to drug use, rather that simply revoking release.
In other words, the approach would be to "tighten the
screws" by, say, intensifying the frequency of testing,
referring the individual to treatment, and even using
short (but increasing long) jail stays to deal with repeated violations, followed by re-release. In this way, strict
accountability would be established. Some, of course,
would not respond. This mechanism would be useful in
identifying those individuals, and reserving our most
expensive options for them.
A bifurcated system would be forseeably necessary where
the counselling and legal monitoring functions are split
to avoid the inevitable conflicts that arise. This approach has been used successfully in some treatment
settings and could be applied in the management of high
numbers of individuals.

The proposed strategy outlined above should not be viewed
as a "solution" to the drug problem. It does not deal with underlying societal problems. It does not address the critical need
for more and better treatment, more education, greater resourc-
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es. It does suggest that we are presently missing an opportunity to exert meaningful control over that segment of drug users
that is most problematic--those drug abusers found in the criminal justice system.
The technology is here today to put this approach into
effect. While legal issues must be carefully addressed, it must
be remembered that we are talking about a population already
under the jurisdiction of the court. Implementation of such a
program would be difficult, but certainly not impossible. While
it would be expensive, let us not lose sight of the fact that it
would be more cost effective than any of the alternatives, including the alternative of doing nothing.
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